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We investigate whether differences in terrorism risk are mirrored on terrorism risk concern 
across European countries for the period 2003-2007. We find that the average propensity for 
terrorism  risk  concern  is  indeed  affected  by  actual  risk  levels.  Furthermore,  country  and 
individual heterogeneity contribute substantially to the variation of observed risk concern. 
According to our findings, males, singles and individuals with white collar jobs are less likely 
to  mention  terrorism  as  one  of  the  most  pressing  issues  their  country  faces.  In  contrast, 
political positioning towards the right end of the spectrum and living in rural areas make it 
more likely to be concerned about terrorism. As far as competing risks are concerned, we find 
that  the  likelihood  terrorism  is  mentioned  increases  when  competing  risks'  drivers  also 
increase  such  as  taxation,  inflation,  unemployment  and  poverty  risk  at  work.  In  contrast, 
terrorism is less likely to be mentioned when the determinants of crime, immigration rates, 
housing costs and pensions are higher. Finally, based on the Bayesian framework we also 
examine the formation of terrorism risk perceptions, and decompose the observed country 
level time series of terrorism activity into a long and a short run component. We conclude that 
the observed risk concern variation is mostly explained by the trend part of terrorism activity 
countries face, although cyclical variations are also important. 
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 1.  Introduction 
  There is a burgeoning literature that focuses on the manner in which people shape 
their perceptions regarding several hazards (Slovic 1999, Weber 2003, Loewenstein et al., 
2001). In the post 9/11 era, terrorism which is a human-made hazard, has been added to the 
already long list of other hazards (Slovic and Weber 2002, Sjöberg 2005, Sunstein 2003). As 
a result, sluggishly but steadily, relevant questions appear in regular opinion surveys on risk 
perception. In this paper we use micro-level data for European countries obtained from the 
Eurobarometer survey. Although there are no direct risk perception questions, there is a set of 
questions asking respondents to state which are the two most important issues their country 
faced, with terrorism being among these issues. We conduct a simple econometric analysis 
that aims to explore whether differences in terrorism risk perception reflect the underlying 
differences in country-level terrorism risk. Our econometric model, over and above country 
and time fixed effects, controls for individual heterogeneity by including several respondent-
specific variables and in addition, is augmented by the drivers of terrorism‟s competing risks 
in order to capture the sampling process.       
Moreover,  motivated  by  the  Bayesian  framework,  we  proceed  by  breaking  down 
country terrorism risk into a long run and a short run component. We then project terrorism 
risk perception on these two components in an attempt to investigate their impact (Viscusi and 
O'Connor 1984; Viscusi 1985, 1989; Evans and Viscusi 1991; Viscusi and Evans 1998). The 
present  study  makes  a  twofold  contribution  to  the  literature:  firstly,  it  extends  the  risk 
perception  literature  with  special  reference  to  terrorism,  and  secondly  presents  the  first 
microeconometric analysis for European countries.  
Pinning down the drivers of terrorism risk concern is important since the public‟s 
terrorism risk concern (perception) is known to affect non-economic aspects of behavior (see 
Elster 1998; Schuster et al. 2001; Berrebi and Klor 2006; Frey et al. 2007), and also induce 3 
 
indirect  adverse  economic  effects  via  increasing  fear  and  uncertainty  (see  Becker  and 
Rubinstein 2004, Christelis and Georgarakos 2009).    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data under 
scrutiny. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology adopted for analyzing terrorism risk 
concern. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results from the main model, while 
Section 5 conducts a further analysis by decomposing terrorism index into a long and a short 
run component. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
2.  Data Issues and background analysis 
Data on terrorism concern for 2003-2008 (broken down to six month intervals Spring-
Autumn) were obtained from the Eurobarometer (ZA: 3904, 3938, 4056, 4229, 4411, 4414, 
4506, 4526, 4530, 4565, 4744) which is a harmonized survey of representative samples for 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxemburg,  Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. Based on responses from the question,  
“What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the 
moment?” 
we construct a dichotomous variable: 
,,
1  if    respondent living in country   at time   mentioned terrorism  






trc                  (1) 
Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics of terrorism risk concern by country and 
year. The differences in terrorism concern between countries are substantial, ranging from 1 
percent of the respondents mentioning terrorism as one of the key issue in one country to 66 4 
 
percent in another. The countries expressing constantly above average terrorism risk concerns 
over the years are Spain, Turkey, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and Denmark.  
-----Insert Table 1 about here----- 
The data also suggest that country-level terrorism risk concern exhibits substantial 
persistence over time, which becomes apparent by simply inspecting the country rankings in 
terms of terrorism risk concern by year, which are reported in Table 2. Formal statistical 
evidence  for  the  cross-sectional  persistence  is  given  by  the  Spearman  correlation  test 
calculated for rankings from adjacent time periods, as well as rankings two periods apart. The 
null of no dependence is emphatically rejected in all cases suggesting that country rankings of 
terrorism risk concern are quite persistent.   
        -----Insert Table 2 about here----- 
2.1  Data on terrorism activity 
We proxy terrorism risk by the following metric (Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004):  








attackrate ,  ,
,




deathrate  and 
,
,





Where   i  denotes country,   t  time period. The advantage of this metric is that it takes into 
account, not only the count of attacks, but also their severity. On the other hand, a problem 
with this metric is that it gives an equal weight to attacks and casualties. For instance, it 
implies that an attack with  one hundred deaths  receives the same weight  as  one hundred 
attacks with one death each. Therefore, we also use the total number of attacks per 100,000 5 
 
inhabitants,  and  casualties  from  these  terrorist  attacks  (deaths  and  wounded  persons  per 
100,000 inhabitants) per year and country separately: 
,, log (1 ) i t i t attackrateindex attackrate   (3) 
, , , log (1 ) i t i t i t casualtyrateindex woundedrate deathrate   (4) 
Data for the period 1994-2007 on terrorist events are obtained from the Global Terrorism 
Database (http://www.start.umd.edu/start/). Data on population were obtained from Eurostat. 
Terrorism risk rates, as well the count of attacks, by country and year are reported in Table 
A.1  in  the  Appendix.  Similar  to  expressed  concerns  about  terrorism,  we  find  that  the 
population risks across the countries are heterogeneous.  
2.2  Data on individual characteristics 
  Individual level information about the respondents is obtained – together with the data 
on terrorism concern – from the Eurobarometer files used in this study. Specifically, we use 
information  on  age,  gender,  political  self-positioning,  years  of  full-time  education, 
occupational type, marital status, and community size. Table A.2 in the Appendix gives an 
overview on these variables. 
2.3  Data on competing risk drivers 
  The wording of the questions  on the most important  issues  in  a country does  not 
prompt respondents to state their levels of concerns for a given topic. Rather, it allows them to 
choose  two  items  from  a  list  of  topics,  thus  asking  respondents  to  rank  their  concerns 
regarding different topics in a relative fashion. It is conceivable that the relative importance of 
different  issues  is  driven  by  their  respective  underlying  risks.  In  order  to  catch  these 
underlying  risks,  we  include  indicators  concerning  crime,  economic  situation,  inflation, 
taxation,  unemployment,  housing,  immigration,  health  care  system,  educational  system, 6 
 
pensions, and protecting the environment. Data for these indicators are also obtained from 
Eurostat. For an overview see Table A.3 in the Appendix.  
3.  Econometric methodology  
  Our  econometric  methodology  is  based  on  three  sequential  steps  where  each 
successive step nests the previous, and effectively enhances  the set  of covariates used to 
explain the observed variation in terrorism risk concern across European countries and across 
time. Due to the annual nature of the competing risk indicators given by Eurostat, and the 
availability of the data over the years, we solely use the Eurobarometer data until 2007 on 
terrorism  risk  concerns.  Further,  using  only  the  autumn  data  takes  into  consideration  the 
information set respondents have at the time of the survey about terrorism and competing 
risks over each year in their countries. 
3.1  Model with country and year fixed effects  
  The first step is a simple probit model where the dependent variable records whether 
the respondent mentioned (or not) terrorism as one of the two major issues her/his country 
faces.  The  only  explanatory  variable  is  each  country‟s  terrorism  index.  The  model  is  as 
follows: 
    , , 0 1 , , Pr 1 j i t i t j t trc terrindex u                         (5) 
Then  we  employ  two  variants  of  this  simple  model:  (i)  a  model  that  includes  country 
dummies  , it C , to capture country heterogeneity, and (ii) a model that also includes, over and 
above country dummies, time fixed effects   t T  in order to capture time variation. Hence the 
models are given below: 
    , , 0 1 , , , Pr 1 j i t i t i t j t trc terrindex u         C                  (6) 
    , , 0 1 , , , Pr 1 j i t i t i t t j t trc terrindex u            CT                             (7) 7 
 
In each equation we expect   1   to be positive, indicating that respondents in countries with 
higher terrorism risk are more likely to mention terrorism as an issue.  
3.2  Model controlling for micro heterogeneity 
  The previous models implicitly assumed that respondent heterogeneity may reflect at 
most country and year differences. Clearly, since the dependent variable is generated from a 
micro survey it is imperative to control for respondent-specific heterogeneity.  In order to 
tackle  this,  we  expand  the  set  of  covariates  with    ,, j i t X   whose  members  are  several 
respondent  characteristics  such  as  their  age,  political  disposition,  education,  occupation, 
gender,  marital  status  and  type  of  community  in  which  they  reside.  The  choice  of  these 
characteristics  was  motivated  by  the  extant  applied  literature  which  has  shown  that  these 
variables are usually significant determinants of risk perception (see e.g. Slovic 1999). Thus, 
the augmented model is as follows:  
    , , 0 1 , , , , , Pr 1 j i t i t i t t j i t j t trc terrindex u                C T X              (8)      
This model is expected to exhibit substantially higher explanatory power since individual 
heterogeneity is controlled for. Moreover, it will allow us to investigate potential differential 
propensities in terrorism risk concern across individuals with dissimilar profiles. In addition, 
we will explore the robustness of the relationship between country-level terrorism risk, the 
stimulus, and micro responses.      
3.3  Model controlling for competing risks 
Recall a peculiarity of the dependent variable‟s sampling rule. Terrorism is one of, the 
thirteen in total, alternative responses among which individuals could only select two. This 
raises  the  possibility  that  terrorism  may  (not)  be  selected,  because  it  represents  a  higher 
(lower) perceived risk compared to the competing risks respondents have to choose from. In 
other words, since respondents must select the two most important issues it is apparent that 8 
 
they resort to a (perceived) hierarchy among the risks. This inherent relativity in the sampling 
rule may distort our previous findings either by inflating or deflating the covariates‟ estimates 
depending on the probability that other risks are mentioned. In order to tackle this, we employ 
the following strategy. Suppose the probability that each alternative risk mentioned depends 
on a risk-specific driver. This is similar to our modeling approach so far, where mentioning 
terrorism depends on terrorism risk. Hence, we control for the fact that terrorism is (not) 
mentioned conditional on other risks being more (less) likely to be mentioned.  Thus our 
model includes an extra vector of covariates    , it Z , whose members are the competing risks‟ 
drivers, and is as follows: 
    , , 0 1 , , , , , , Pr 1 j i t i t i t t j i t i t j t trc terrindex u                   C T X Z            (9)                  
We are again primarily interested in the sign and significance of the terrorism risk‟ 
coefficient. However, this setup permits us to investigate some further issues. First, joint (in)-
significance  of  the  competing  risk  drivers‟  coefficients  would  reveal  that  terrorism  risk 
concern is (autonomously) jointly determined by other competing risks. Moreover, inspecting 
the competing risks‟ coefficients individually can convey important information. For instance, 
the significance of particular competing risk coefficients would indicate which competing 
risks  tend  to  affect  terrorism  risk  concern  responses.  In  addition,  the  sign  pattern  of  the 
significant coefficients would be revealing „complementarities‟ or „substitutabilities‟ between 
terrorism risk concern and other competing risks. Our indicators for competing risks can be 
divided into two categories: (1) those where we can easily assume that rising values of that 
variable are „good news‟ for the respondents, thus decreasing concern levels about that issue 
(e.g.  spendings  on  education  or  pensions);  and  (2)  those  where  rising  values  indicate  a 
worsening situation, e.g. unemployment rate, infant mortality rate, etc. Competing risks of the 
first category entering the model with significantly negative coefficients, and competing risks 
of  the  second  category  with  significant  positive  coefficients  would  suggest  a 9 
 
„complementarity‟, implying that a „bad state‟ in any of those indicators increases the odds to 
worry  about  terrorism.  In  contrast,  risks  of  the  first  category  entering  the  model  with 
significantly positive coefficients, and risks of the second category entering with negative 
coefficients would imply that they tend to displace terrorism risk concern. In other words, 
concern  about  these  competing  risks  would  exhibit  'substitutability'  with  terrorism  risk 
concern.                  
4.  Empirical results  
The first three columns of Table 3 report the results from the simplest probit model 
where  neither  micro  heterogeneity  nor  competing  risks  are  considered.  Country-level 
terrorism risk carries a positive coefficient suggesting that higher terrorism risk increases the 
likelihood that the average individual from that country mentions terrorism as an issue. Note 
that  the  model  where  no  heterogeneity  whatsoever  is  allowed  (column  1),  explains 
approximately  5%  of  the  observed  variation  in  terrorism  risk  concern.  Columns  2  and  3 
correspond to the models where time and country heterogeneity are included. Note that the 
null hypotheses that either country effects or time effects are insignificant are rejected. The 
former  suggests  that  the  propensity  for  the  average  individual  to  mention  terrorism  is 
significantly  determined  by  her/his  country  of  residence,  over  and  above  the  country‟s 
terrorism risk. The latter suggests that the average propensity differs across years. Note also 
that  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model  increases  substantially  from  about  5%  (without 
country and time effects) to about 20%, where the lion share of the incremental explanatory 
power is attributed to country effects. Controlling for country and time effects, we find that 
the country-level terrorism index remains significantly positive, suggesting that the average 
propensity for terrorism risk concern is affected by actual terrorism risk.  
Column 4 of Table 3 reports the estimation results from the probit model that also 
controls  for  individual  heterogeneity.  The  results  are  indicative  of  a  significant  effect  of 10 
 
individual heterogeneity on the likelihood that terrorism is mentioned. Starting with political 
disposition we find that the further to the right a respondent positions herself/himself on the 
political  spectrum,  the  more  likely  she/he  is  to  mention  terrorism  as  an  issue.  Using 
respondents  who  completed  their  full-time  education  by  the  age  of  15  as  the  baseline 
category, we find that people with more years of education are not less likely to mention 
terrorism.  In  fact,  only  those  respondents  with  no  completed  full-time  education  are 
significantly less likely to mention terrorism. This seems surprising at first sight, since other 
studies have found that better education has a negative impact on (terrorism) concern levels. 
However, there are two points: First, other studies analysed the relationship with concern 
levels.  Second,  it  might  be  conceivable  that  respondents  with  no  completed  full-time 
education worry about other issues which have more direct effects on their every day personal 
lives. In addition, we uncover significant gender differences, with male respondents being less 
likely  to  mention  terrorism.  Marital  status  is  also  an  important  determinant,  with  singles 
exhibiting a lower propensity to mention terrorism. A similar direction in propensity is found 
for those being self-employed, managers or having other white collar jobs. Community of 
residence emerges also  as an important factor, with respondents living in rural  areas  and 
villages  being  more likely to  mention  terrorism.  In  general, the individual characteristics' 
coefficients are in line with results reported by previous studies on the determinants of fear or 
concern about terrorism (Huddy et al. 2005, Boscarino et al. 2003, Brück & Müller 2010).             
-----Insert Table 3 about here----- 
In Table 4 we report the estimation results from our full model where apart from 
micro-level heterogeneity, we also control for proxies of the competing risks‟ drivers. We 
present  three  variants  of  the  model  where  each  variant  employs  alternative  proxies  for 
terrorism risk; (i) the metric taking into account the number of attacks and their severity, (ii) 
the index only accounting for the attack risk, and (iii) the index of casualties from terrorist 11 
 
attacks.  The  variable  of  main  interest,  country-level  terrorism  risk,  retains  its  sign  and 
significance. This highlights the robustness of our main finding that the average propensity to 
mention terrorism is significantly increased for respondents living in countries with higher 
terrorism risk. We interpret this as evidence in favor of respondent rationality.  
The presence of competing risks‟ drivers leads to quite similar conclusions regarding 
the impact of individual characteristics. The only individual characteristic that is affected is 
education. Respondents with no full-time education are still less likely to mention terrorism as 
one of their concerns, yet the difference is not significant anymore. At the same time, the 
difference between people who finish their full-time education by the age of 15 and those who 
finish at the age of 16-19 become statistically significant. All other characteristics retain their 
previous signs and significance. Inspecting the results for the competing risks‟ drivers, we 
find  that  they  are  jointly  significant  as  expected.  In  some  more  detail,  we  find  that  the 
probability terrorism is mentioned is strongly affected by almost all competing risk drivers, 
except for the immigration rate and tax wedge. The signs of the significant coefficients are not 
identical  implying  that  the  average  probability  terrorism  concern  is  mentioned,  is  not 
identically  affected  by  competing  risks.  In  particular,  terrorism  risk  concern  exhibits 
„complementarity‟,  i.e.  the  likelihood  that  terrorism  is  mentioned  increases,  with  higher 
inflation  rates,  higher  unemployment  rates,  larger  environmental  issues  in  terms  of  the 
emissions  of  greenhouse  gas,  and  an  increasing  infant  mortality  rate.  In  contrast, 
„substitutability‟  between  terrorism  concern  and  observed  spending  on  pensions  and 
education, crime rates, and the burden of housing is uncovered.                  
-----Insert Table 4 about here----- 
Table 5 shows the results of the same specifications, but using cluster robust standard errors. 
Again,  the  indicators  of  the  severity  of  terrorism  are  highly  significant  in  explaining  the 
dependent variable, and the impact of individual characteristics changes only slightly to the 12 
 
previous specifications: The size of the community a respondent lives in does not play a 
significant  role  anymore  in  determining  the  probabilities  to  mention  terrorism  in  a  given 
country  and  year.  However,  the  effect  of  clustering  on  a  national  level  does  effect  the 
significances of the competing risk drivers. We find that only housing issues significantly 
affect the probability to mention terrorism as one of the most important issues in a country 
across the specifications, and that it works as a substitute: The higher the costs of housing in a 
given  country,  the  lower  the  probability  that  terrorism  is  picked  as  one  of  the  two  most 
concerning issues. 
-----Insert Table 5 about here----- 
5.  Further  Analysis:  Terrorism  risk  concern  and  decomposed 
terrorism index  
We use the Bayesian framework as our departure point where risk perception is a 
weighted average of the reference risk  ,,
p
j i t trc , based on prior beliefs (ex ante perceived risk), 
and the arrival of new information  ,,
s
j i t r
,
 corresponding to the sample risk inferred from the 
information (Viscusi and O'Connor 1984;  Viscusi 1985, 1989; Smith and Michaels 1987; 
Smith  and  Johnson  1988;  Loewenstein  and  Mather  1990;  Smith  et  al.  1990;  Evans  and 
Viscusi 1991; Liu et al. 1998; Viscusi and Evans 1998; Smith et al. 2001):  
, , 1 , , 2 , ,
ps
j i t j i t j i t trc w trc w r                  (10) 
Where  12 , ww  are positive constants.  
In  equation  (10)  one  has  to  deal  with  the  latent  nature  of  the  prior  concern  and  the 
measurement of sample risk. To this end we assume that the public‟s prior terrorism concerns 
reflect a fundamental characteristic, and are shaped by the country‟s overall past experience 
with terrorism. Hence the first building block is that priors are a function of a country‟s long 




j i t i t trc ltr                      (11)
   
Where  0   .   
The sample risk is derived as the difference between current terrorism risk and long-term 
terrorism risk:  
, , , ,
s
j i t i t i t r terrindex ltr                     (12) 
Hence:  
, , 1 , 2 , , j i t i t i t i t trc w ltr w terrindex ltr                (13) 
Now  equation  (10)  is  operational  provided  that  long-term  terrorism  risk  and 
innovations  of  terrorism  risk  are  available.  We  derive  these  quantities  by  employing  a 
standard time series decomposition of  , it terrindex , into a long-run trend  , it  and a cyclical 
component  , it c , in an additive manner (see Harvey 1985; Clark 1987):  
, , , i t i t i t terrindex c                                (14) 
We  decompose  the  terrorism  index  employing  three  alternative  smoothing 
specifications:  moving  average  (using  a  window  of  1.5  and  2.5  years)  or  exponential 
smoothing,  using  a  non-linear  optimizer  to  choose  the  smoothing  parameter       which 
minimizes the sum of squared residuals. Thus, the trend component  , it  for each country is: 
, 2 , 1 , 3
, 3




, 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 5
, 5
i t i t i t i t i t ma
it
terrindex terrindex terrindex terrindex terrindex
, and  
exp
, , 1 , 2 * 1 * i t i t i t terrindex terrindex . 
The estimation of the long term terrorism risk  , it  permits us to compute the cyclical 
component  , it c ,  as  the  deviation  of  the  current  terrorism  risk  from  the  trend.  Thus  we 14 
 
explore the Bayesian property of terrorism concern by testing whether prior beliefs and new 
information have a positive and significant impact (λ‟s >0):   
      , , 0 , , , , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , Pr 1
kk
j i t i t t j i t i t i t i t j t trc c                        C T X Z                                      (15) 
Where the superscript  k  denotes each alternative smoothing method and  , it  is a 
random  disturbance,  while  the  's   are  constant  parameters.  Note,  that  for  the 
decomposition of terrorism risk we now use time periods of 6 months each, allowing for more 
variation in long-term trends and short-term deviations, and thereby allowing for shorter term 
impacts of the components. 
In  table  6  we  report  the  results  where,  instead  of  terrorism  risk,  we  employ  its 
decomposed constituent series; the short run (cyclical) and long run (trend) components. The 
results from the MA(3) and the exponential smoothing are quite similar, suggesting that the 
probability  of  mentioning  terrorism  is  responsive  to  both  the  trend  and  the  cyclical 
component. The results from the MA(5) suggest, that the probability to mention terrorism is 
only  affected  by  the  long-term  trend.  Overall,  we  conclude  that  agents‟  terrorism  risk 
perception is more heavily affected by long-term trends in terrorism risk, with short-term 
variations  playing  a  smaller  role  (in  terms  of  size  of  the  coefficient,  and  statistical 
significance). This finding is consistent with Bayesian updating, where agents reshape their 
perceived terrorism risk in  the  face of terrorism  shocks  that  represent the arrival of new 
information. With regards to respondent heterogeneity and the impact of competing risks, 
there are no grave differences from the previous models.       
-----Insert Table 6 about here----- 
6.  Conclusions 
  In  this  study  we  investigate  whether  differences  in  terrorism  risk  are  mirrored  on 
terrorism  risk  perception  across  European  countries  for  the  period  2003-2007,  based  on 15 
 
micro-level responses from the Eurobarometer. Our strategy is to sequentially add different 
sets of covariates in order to analyze observed variations in terrorism risk concern across 
countries and time in Europe. We find that across all specifications the average propensity for 
terrorism risk concern is affected by actual risk levels. Furthermore, country and individual 
heterogeneity contribute significantly to the explanation of observed variations in terrorism 
risk perceptions. We find that males, singles and individuals with white collar jobs are less 
likely  to  mention  terrorism  as  one  of  the  most  pressing  issues  their  country  faces  at  the 
moment. On the contrary, political positioning towards the right end of the spectrum and 
living in rural areas make it more likely to be concerned about terrorism. Due to the nature of 
our dependent variable being one amongst thirteen alternative responses to be selected, we 
test for competing risks that might affect terrorism risk concerns. We find that there are risks 
that raise the likelihood of terrorism being mentioned as one of the issues, e.g. inflation and 
unemployment rate, environmental issues, and health indicators; and that there are risks that 
work as substitutes, i.e. make it less likely that respondents worry about terrorism, e.g. crime 
rates, housing costs, and spending on education and pensions. 
Finally, on the Bayesian framework we also examined the formation of terrorism risk 
perceptions, and decomposed the observed country level time series of terrorism activity into 
a long and a short run component. Utilizing different alternative decomposing techniques we 
conclude that the observed risk perception variation is largely explained by the long-term 
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Tables  
Table 1. Unconditional probability that terrorism concern is mentioned by country and year  
Country  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Average  
over years 
Austria  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.06  0.05 
Belgium  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.05 
Bulgaria  .  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.03 
Croatia  .  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Cyprus  .  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.03 
Czech Republic  .  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Denmark  0.14  0.16  0.23  0.34  0.19  0.13  0.20 
Estonia  .  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02 
Finland  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.03 
France  0.11  0.10  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.03  0.07 
Germany  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.03  0.05 
Great Britain  0.23  0.26  0.24  0.26  0.21  0.13  0.22 
Greece  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03 
Hungary  .  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Ireland  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.01  0.04 
Italy  0.16  0.14  0.09  0.12  0.08  0.02  0.10 
Latvia  .  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
Lithuania  .  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Luxembourg  0.07  0.11  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.02  0.06 
Malta  .  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02 
Netherlands  0.05  0.09  0.31  0.22  0.13  0.15  0.16 
Northern Ireland  0.40  0.28  0.23  0.26  0.19  0.10  0.24 
Poland  .  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.03 
Portugal  0.04  0.06  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
Romania  .  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03 
Slovakia  .  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.04 
Slovenia  .  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01 
Spain  0.52  0.59  0.38  0.32  0.42  0.32  0.43 
Sweden  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.03 
Turkey  .  0.19  0.34  0.48  0.64  0.43  0.42 
Average  
over countries 
0.13  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.08 




Table 2. Ranking of countries based on unconditional probability of terrorism risk concern by 
year 
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0.74***  0.86***  0.78***  0.72***  -  - 
Notes: (a) Source Eurobarometer files Spring 2003 – Spring 2008, own calculations, (b) countries within deciles are ordered 
alphabetically, (c) *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively, (d) Spearman's correlation 
coefficient between the proportion of respondents expressing concerns in t and t+1 over all countries, (e) Spearman's rank 





Table 3: Probit Model for Terrorism Risk Concern 
  No Micro Heterogeneity  With Micro Heterogeneity 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












Country dummies  -  Included  Included  Included 
Time dummies  -  -  Included  Included 












































16-19 years of education  - 













































































Zero country effects  -  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Zero time effects  -  -  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Zero individual effects  -  -  -  [0.000] 
N  131270  131270  131270  129212 
pseudo R
2  0.046  0.197  0.199  0.201 
AIC  78377.0  66086.5  65866.6  64152.0 
BIC  78396.6  66380.1  66199.3  64630.7 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors in parentheses, (b) one, two, three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 




Table 4: Probit models for terrorism risk concern controlling for competing concerns, country and year effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 




























Country dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Time dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Individual characteristics 









































































































Competing risk drivers 





























































































N  52333  52333  52333 
pseudo R
2  0.198  0.199  0.198 
AIC  29431.5  29429.0  29431.5 
BIC  29901.3  29898.9  29901.4 
Zero country effects  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Zero time effects  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Zero individual effects  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Zero competing risks effects  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors in parentheses, (b) one, two, three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level respectively, (c) p-value in square brackets, (d) non-responses to political orientation and community size 
controlled for. 23 
 
 
Table 5: Probit models for terrorism risk concern controlling for competing concerns, country and year effects 
using cluster robust standard errors 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 



























Country dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Time dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Individual characteristics 
































































































Competing risk drivers 










































































N  52333  52333  52333 
pseudo R
2  0.198  0.199  0.198 
AIC  29371.5  29369.0  29371.5 
BIC  29575.4  29572.9  29575.4 
Zero country effects  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Zero time effects  [0.123]  [0.098]  [0.127] 
Zero individual effects  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Zero competing risks effects  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Notes: (a) Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, (b) one, two, three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 
and  1  percent  level  respectively,  (c)  p-value  in  square  brackets,  (d)  non-responses  to  political  orientation  and 




Table 6: Probit models for terrorism risk concern using decomposed terrorism risk 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Terrorism risk index 
Trend component, MA3 
2.353
*** 
(0.307)  -  - 
 
Terrorism risk index 
Cycle component, MA3 
0.360
** 
(0.166)  -  - 
 
Terrorism risk index 






Terrorism risk index 




Terrorism risk index 






Terrorism risk index 












Time dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Individual characteristics 





































































































Competing risk drivers 
















































































N  52333  52333  52333 
pseudo R
2  0.163  0.161  0.148 
AIC  30687.1  30745.8  31213.6 
BIC  30891.0  30949.7  31417.5 
Zero time effects  [0.699]  [0.507]  [0.644] 
Zero individual effects  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Zero competing risks effects  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Notes: (a) Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, (b) one, two, three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 
and  1  percent  level  respectively,  (c)  p-value  in  square  brackets,  (d)  non-responses  to  political  orientation  and 




Table A.1:  Current terrorism risk per 100 thousand inhabitants and absolute numbers of incidents by 
country and year 
Country  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2: Definition of the individual characteristics 
Variable   Coding 
Age  Age (15-98) 
Age squared  Square of age  
Male  1 = male, 0 female 
Political left  1 = political left (1-4), 0 otherwise 
Political center  1 = political middle (5-6), 0 otherwise 
Political right  1 = political right (7-10), 0 otherwise 
Politscale_nr  1 = political indecisive or refuse, 0 otherwise 
No full-time 
education  1 = no full-time education, 0 otherwise 
15 years of 
education  1 = up to 15 years of education, 0 otherwise 
16-19 years of 
education  1 = between 16-19 years of education, 0 otherwise 
More than 20 
years of 
education 
1 = more than 20 years of education, 0 otherwise 
Studying  1 = still studying, 0 otherwise 
Occupation 
white 




1= the respondent is not married, remarried or unmarried currently living with a partner, 0 
otherwise 
Rural area 




1 = respondent lives in small or middle sized town, 0 otherwise 
Large town 
  1 = respondent lives in large town, 0 otherwise 
Community_nr 
  1 = respondent does not know size of his community, 0 otherwise 
Source: Eurobarometer files Spring 2003 – Spring 2008.  29 
 
 
Table A.3: Definition of the competing risk indicators 
Competing risk as 
mentioned in the 
Eurobarometer 
Driver proxy  Definition 
Crime  Crime rate  Numbers of all types of registered crime, per 100.000 
inhabitants. 
Economic situation  Economic sentiment 
indicator 
A composite indicator made up of five sectoral 
confidence indicators with different weights: Industrial 
confidence indicator, Services confidence indicator, 
Consumer confidence indicator, Construction confidence 
indicator Retail trade confidence indicator. 
Rising prices / Inflation  Inflation rate  Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of 
Consumer Prices. 
Taxation  Tax wedge  The tax wedge on the labour cost measures the relative 
tax burden for an employed person with low earnings. 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate  Unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. 
Housing  Housing  Financial burden of the repayment of debts from hire 
purchases or loans. 
Immigration  Immigration rate 
The number of foreigners including citizens of other EU 
Member States and non-EU citizens, usually resident in 
the reporting country, per 100.000 inhabitants. 
Health care system  Infant mortality rate 
The ratio of the number of deaths of children under one 
year of age during the year to the number of live births in 
that year. The value is expressed per 1 000 live births. 
Educational system  Spending on education  Spending on education as % of GDP / public spending. 




emissions  Index of greenhouse gas emissions in CO2 equivalents. 
Source: Eurostat. 
 